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Current and future computerized systems and in-
frastructures are going to be based on the layering of dif-
ferent systems, designed at different times, with different
technologies and components and difficult to integrate.
Control systems and resource management systems are in-
creasingly employed in such large and heterogeneous en-
vironment as a parallel infrastructure to allow an effi-
cient, dependable and scalable usage of the system com-
ponents. System complexity comes out to be a paramount
challenge to solve from a number of different viewpoints,
including dependability modeling and evaluation. Key
directions to deal with system complexity are abstraction
and hierarchical structuring of the system functionalities.
This paper addresses the issue of an efficient dependabil-
ity evaluation by a model-based approach of hierarchical
control and resource management systems. We exploited
the characteristics of this specific, but important, class of
systems and derived a modeling methodology that is not
only directed to build models in a compositional way, but
it also includes some capabilities to reduce their solution
complexity. The modeling methodology and the resolu-
tion technique are then applied to a case study consisting
of a resource management system developed in the context
of the ongoing European project CAUTION++. The re-
sults obtained are useful to understand the impact of sev-
eral system component factors on the dependability of the
overall system instance.
Keywords:Modeling Methodology, Quality of Ser-
vice, Modular & Hierarchical Modeling, Petri Nets, Valida-
tion, Control Systems & Infrastructures
1 INTRODUCTION
Current and future computerized systems and infra-
structures are based more and more on the layering of dif-
ferent systems, designed in different times, with different
technologies and components and difficult to integrate.
Control systems and resource management systems are in-
creasingly employed in such large and heterogeneous en-
vironment to allow an efficient, dependable and scalable
usage of the system components. In such landscape, sys-
tem complexity comes out to be a paramount challenge to
cope with from a number of different points of view, includ-
ing dependability evaluation. Key directions to deal with
system complexity are abstraction and hierarchical struc-
turing of the system functionalities.
System evaluation is a key activity of fault forecast-
ing, aimed at providing statistically well-founded quantita-
tive measures of how much we can rely on a system. In
particular, system evaluation achieved through modelling
supports the prediction of how much we will be able to rely
on a system before incurring the costs of building it. It is
therefore a very profitable evaluation approach to be em-
ployed since the very beginning of a system development
activity.
Most of the new challenges in dependability model-
ling are connected with the increasing complexity and
dynamicity of the systems under analysis. Such complexity
needs to be attacked both from the point of view of system
representation and of the underlying model solution. In fact,
the state space explosion is a well known problem in model-
based dependability analysis, which strongly limits the ap-
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plicability of this method to large complex systems, or
heavily impacts on the accuracy of the evaluation results
when simplifying assumptions are made as a remedy to this
problem. Modular and hierarchical approaches have been
identiffied as effective directions. Resorting to a hierarchi-
cal approach brings benefits under several aspects, among
which: i) facilitating the construction of models; ii) speed-
ing up their solution; iii) favoring scalability; iv) mastering
complexity (by handling smaller models through hiding, at
one hierarchical level, some modeling details of the lower
one). At each level, details of the architecture and of the
status of lower level components are not meaningful, and
only aggregated information should be used. Therefore,
information of the detailed models at one level should be
aggregated in an abstract model at a higher level. Important
issues are how to abstract all the relevant information of
one level to the upper one and how to compose the derived
abstract models. However, it is important to underline that
the modularity of the modelling approach alone cannot be
truly effective without a modular solution of the defined
models.
In this paper, we focus on the class of control and
resource management systems. To cope with their increas-
ing complexity, such systems are typically developed in a
hierarchical fashion: the functionalities of the whole sys-
tem are partitioned among a number of subsystems work-
ing at different levels of a hierarchy. At each level, a sub-
system has knowledge and control of the portion of system
under its control (lower levels), while it acts just as an ac-
tuator with respect to the higher level subsystems. In this
organization, the flow of the information goes vertically from
one level to the other, but not horizontally inside the same
level. More precisely, the flow of decision taking goes from
the bottom to the top, while the flow for decision actuation
goes from the top to the bottom. Here we are interested in
modeling and evaluating the system behavior with refer-
ence to a unidirectional flow (be it for decision taking or for
decision actuation). To improve dependability, fault toler-
ance measures may be taken at each level, typically intro-
ducing interface checks to cope with erroneous inputs and/
or outputs and internal checks to cope with faults during
the internal computation. We exploited the characteristics
of this specific, but well representative, class of systems
and derived a modeling methodology that is not only di-
rected to build models in a compositional way, but it also
includes some capabilities to reduce their solution com-
plexity. To show how it works, in the second part of the
paper we applied the methodology to a case study, which
consists of a resource management system developed in-
side the CAUTION++ project [1].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides some preliminaries on the considered class
of systems. Section 3 outlines the modeling approach. Sec-
tion 4 presents the multi-stage system instance considered
in the analysis. In Section 5 the models set-up for the se-
lected CAUTION++ instance are discussed, while the re-
sults of the numerical evaluation are provided in Section 6.
Finally, conclusions are in Section 7.
2 SYSTEM CONTEXT
The class of systems we focus on consists of a set
of hardware or software components (the Comp boxes),
which are grouped in “stages” (Stage 1, ..., Stage k, ..., Stage
N), as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Class of systems with “multi-stage” representation
Components at a certain stage may interact with oth-
ers at an higher level through some “Dependency connec-
tions”. Each connection identifies a dependency between
two system components: a component A is connected to a
component B (A→  B) if B is dependent from A, that is the
behavior of B depends on the behavior of A. The compo-
nents without any incoming connections have an indepen-
dent behavior with respect to the others, while the compo-
nents without any outgoing connections (called root com-
ponents, the dashed boxes in the figure) do not affect the
behavior of any other component.
From the general system depicted in Figure 1 and
following the dependency connections from a root compo-
nent back to the leaves of the graph, a number of individual
subsystems structured in a hierarchical fashion may be de-
rived, equal to the number of root components.
As already discussed earlier, a component at stage
k may interact only with those at stages k-1 and k+1 and
these dependencies are unidirectional, from the lower stage
to the higher one. A dependency between one component
at stage k and more than one component at stage k+1 is
not explicitly considered as it is equivalent to consider some
(logical) replications of the component at stage k, each one
interacting with only one component at stage k+1. In do-
ing this we make the assumption that, if a component is
used in computing two or more outcomes, its behavior is
independently modeled in each context. This means that
the behavior of each replica does not depend on the behav-
ior of the others.
The components in a stage can be partitioned in
more sub-sets (groups), each one composed of components
having a connection to the same component in the next
stage.
For a better understanding, let us consider the ex-
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Figure 2: Example of system
It is a system with eight different components, two
of which are root nodes. The corresponding representa-
tion, by grouping components in stages, is shown in Figure
3. The original system has been decomposed in two sub-
systems of four and three stages, respectively, obtained
following the reversal path from each root node to the leaves.
We note that COMP 6 is replicated twice in the first sub-
system, as it is originally connected to two different com-
ponents (COMP 1 and COMP 7, see Figure 2). We identify the
groups composed of more that one component with a dot-
ted circle.
In the following Subsection we detail the system’s
behavior, specifying how two generic components may in-
teract each other.
2.1 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COMPONENTS
AND MEASURES OF INTEREST
The interactions among components and the failure
assumptions on each component are highlighted in Figure
4. This scheme is very general and must be specialized for
the particular component under analysis. To explain the
generic component’s behavior, let’s suppose it receives an
input following a Poisson distribution with a rate λIN. These
inputs are assumed to be correct or incorrect with a prob-
ability α and 1– α, respectively. In correspondence of in-
puts, which arrive with a rate λIN, the component produces
an output with a rate p * λIN, where p is the probability a
received input leads the component to produce an output.
Moreover, the component is assumed to possibly behave
incorrectly by self-generating spurious outputs with a rate
λS. Thus, the “potential”1  output rate of the component is
expressed as λIN OUT = λIN + λS.
For the sake of clarity, we give some deffinitions
that we will use in the rest of the paper. A correct emission
is the emission of a correct output, that occurs whenever a
correct output is produced. It is possible i) in response to a
correct input if the system is free from errors, or ii) in re-
sponse to a correct input, if system errors are detected and
tolerated. A correct silence is the non-emission of an incor-
rect output and it may happen as consequence of an incor-
rect input (if the incorrectness of the input is detected, for
example using interface checks) or of an erroneous status
of the system. An incorrect emission is the emission of an
incorrect output and it happens either in reply to an incor-
rect input, or as consequence of a spurious output or of a
wrong processing of a correct input. Finally, an incorrect
silence is the non-emission of a correct output and it may
happen as consequence of wrong processing of a correct
input. These input-output combinations are summarized in
Table 1.
COMP 1
COMP 6 COMP 7 COMP 8
COMP 2 COMP 3
COMP 5
COMP 4












COMP 7 COMP 4+
Figure 3: Example of “multi-stage” representation
Input





Correct Emission, Incorrect Emission, Incorrect Silence
Correct Silence, Incorrect Emission
Table 1 - Input-output combinations
1 Here, a “potential” output encompasses both emitted and non-
emitted output (p = 1), while for “output” we refer only to those
emitted.
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Therefore, each component can be characterized by
two input parameters (α and λIN) and by the following five
output parameters:
- PCorrect, that is the probability of generating acorrect
output (correct emission);
- PCorrupted, that is the probability of generating an
incorrect output (incorrect emission);
- PnoOutCorr, that is the probability that the output is
correctly non-emitted (correct silence);
- PnoOutIncorr, that is the probability that the output is
incorrectly non-emitted (incorrect silence);
- λOUT, that is the rate of the propagation of an output
from the component to another. In particular, λOUT =
(PCorrect + PCorrupted) * λIN–>OUT.
From the point of view of propagation, it is clear that
not all the outputs generated at a stage are always propa-
gated up to the root. In fact when a component receives an
output (correct or incorrect), it can operate in two different
ways, depending on the correctness of the output received
and on its internal state: it can generate another output and
propagate it to the next stage (emission behavior), or it can
not emit any output, thus interrupting the propagation flow
(silence behavior).
Given the behavior structure and failure semantics
depicted in Figure 4, typical measures of interest from the
dependability point of view in this context include:
1. The probability of correct and incorrect emission;
2. The probability of correct and incorrect silence;
3. The overall probability that the system does not un-
dertake wrong actions;
4. The mean time to incorrect emission.
In Section 5 we will specify the measures to evaluate
with reference to a particular resource management system.
3 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODELING METHODOLOGY
The modeling methodology, originally introduced
in [2], is fully described in this section. First, we deal with
the model design process, that is, how to model a complex
system starting from its functional specification and apply-
ing a stepwise refinement to decompose it in small sub-
models. Then, the second part of the methodology is pre-
sented, which concerns the modular model solution, car-
ried out in a bottom-up fashion. The philosophy of our
modeling approach is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Modeling approach
In order to construct an efficient, scalable and easily
maintainable architectural model, we introduce a stepwise
modeling refinement approach, both for the model design
process and for the model solution. Another advantage of
this approach is to allow models refinement as soon as sys-
tem implementation details are known or/and need to be
added or investigated.
3.1 THE MODEL DESIGN PROCESS
The model design process adopts a top-down ap-
proach, moving from the entire system description to the
definition of the detailed sub-models, while the model solu-
tion process follows a bottom-up approach.
As inspired by [3], the system is firstly analyzed
from a functional point of view (functional analysis), in or-
der to identify its critical system functions with respect to
the validation objectives. Each of these functions corre-
sponds to a critical service provided by a component.
The overall system is then decomposed in subcom-
ponents, each one performing a critical subfunction, and
each subfunction is implemented using a model that de-
scribes its behavior. Therefore, starting from the high-level
abstract model, we perform a decomposition in more elemen-
tary (but more detailed) sub-models, until the required level
of detail is obtained.
The definition of the functional (abstract) model rep-
resents the first step of our modeling approach. The rules
and the interfaces for merging them in the architectural de-
pendability model are also identified in this phase. The sec-Figure 4: How a generic component interacts with others
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ond step consists in detailing each service in terms of its
software and hardware components in a detailed (struc-
tural) model accounting for their behavior (with respect to
the occurrence of faults). The fundamental property of a
functional model is to take into account all the relationships
among services: a service can depend directly from the state
of another service or, indirectly, on the output generated
from another service. The detailed model defines the struc-
tural dependencies (when existing) among the internal sub-
components: the state of a sub-component can depend from
the state (failed or healthy) of another sub-component.
Figure 6: Functional-level model related to a single Service
Figure 6 shows the functional-level model related to
a single service. The internal state S is here composed of
the place U, representing the nominal state, and of the places
D1 ... DM, representing different possible erroneous (de-
graded) states. The places I1 ... IL and O1 ... ON represent,
respectively, the input (correct or exceptional, due to propa-
gation of failures from interacting modules) and the output
of the model (correct behavior or failure - distinguishing
several failure modes). The state changes (from the nomi-
nal, correct state to the erroneous states and viceversa)
and the flow between the input and output places are regu-
lated by a structural model of the service implementation,
indicated in Figure 6 as a black cloud.
3.2 THE MODEL SOLUTION PROCESS
The model solution follows a bottom-up approach
from the detailed model up to the abstract model. The imple-
mentation is strictly related to the environment characteris-
tics of the system under analysis. Actually, starting from
the general class of systems of Figure 1, we can derive
several simplified systems that can be solved very efficiently.
3.2.1 ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the generic
system of Figure 1 has one root node only. If it is not the
case, we can decompose the system in more sub-systems
having one root each, as explained in Section 2. We denote
with, λiOUT, COMP  the intensity of the output process of the
i-th component belonging to stage k (                 ). We make
the following assumptions:
1. The distribution of the input process of each compo-
nent is Poisson with rate, λIN. This is accepted in the
literature when the number of arrivals in a given time
interval are independent of past arrivals.
2. The distribution of the output process of each com-
ponent is Poisson distributed with a rate, λOUT . This
assumption corresponds, for example, to the case in
which the inputs are processed sequentially with-
out queuing and losses, and the processing time of
the input is deterministic. Equivalently, we could
obtain the same output distribution considering that
the service time is Poisson distributed and that the
component operates as a steady-state M/M/1 queu-
ing network [4].
Suppose to have a group of  components at stage
k (               , ...,                  ). We remind that a group is a set of
components belonging to a stage, and connected to the
same component in the next stage. Using the assumption
that the output process of                  is Poisson distributed
with rate λ                     the superposition of Poisson
processes with intensities, λ                     ,... λ
is equivalent to  a  Poisson process with intensity equal to
λ                 + . . .  + λ                .
Solving the detailed model of components COMP%,
... , COMPk leads to the evaluation of the probabilities of
correct/incorrect output (both propagated and not propa-
gated to the next stage) and the intensity of the output
process of a group of components. Let’s defining as
d                  , and                              the probability of correct
emission, and the probability of incorrect emission of
COMPKI, respectively. Notice that these probabilities de-
pend upon the intensity of the input process ( λ                      )
and of spurious alarms  (λCOMP K  ) (both supposed being
Poisson). The following relations holds:
where   is the intensity of the process
achieved by aggregating the output processes of the com-
ponents , while is the 
probability that the next component at stage k + 1 receives
a correct input. Analogous considerations hold for
, and so on. This general approach can be speci-
fied for the following cases:
(I) If all groups at stage k are identical, the total number
of detailed models to be solved in order to evaluate
the system’s behavior is equal to , where K
is the number of stages in the system and Nk is the
number of components belonging to each identical
group at stage k.
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(II) If all groups at stage k can not be considered identi-
cal at each stage, the number of models to be solved
depends on the number of diffeerent “branches” in
which the overall model can be simplified.
(III) If for each stage k of the system, all the compo-
nents are identical, it is possible to solve only K
detailed models, one for each stage. Therefore, if
all the components at level k are identical, then
the previous equations
reduce to
where  is the total number of components at
stage k.
In this case, the general model of Figure 1 is reduced
to the equivalent simplified system model of Figure 7 that
can be solved more easily, as the “tree” structure collapses
in a unique “branch” from the point of view of system evalu-
ation.
We note that case (II) is the more general one; next
is case (I) and the least general is case (III). If it can not be
assumed that the output process of  follows a 
Poisson distribution, the general approach is still valid pro-
vided that the detailed model is slightly modified allowing
to estimate the real distribution of such a process. The same
distribution will be used as input at the k + 1 stage. How-
ever, in general, it will be no longer possible to solve the
models analytically.
If the measures of interest are probabilities, the mo-
ments of the distribution of correct/incorrect output (both
propagated and not propagated to the next stage) which
yield such probabilities are not considered at all. In this
case it is not necessary to use, at the abstract level, models
having the same distribution estimated at the detailed ones.
If, on the contrary, we are interested in evaluating the mo-
ments, the output processes distributions achieved by the
detailed models have to be used for the solution of the
abstract models.
3.2.2 THE MODEL SOLUTION SCHEME
According to Figure 5 (showing the philosophy of
our modeling approach) the model solution follows a bot-
tom-up approach: the solution of a detailed model is ex-
ploited to set up the parameters of the corresponding ab-
stract model and of the detailed model of the next (contigu-
ous) components (the output of the detailed model
acts as input for the detailed  model). To keep the
presentation simple, the model solution scheme is described
in the case where, for each stage k, all the components at
stage k are identical; therefore only K detailed models (one
for each stage) have to be solved. Figure 8 shows the rela-
tionships among a detailed model of and the model
 .
With reference to the measures of interest listed in
Section 2.1, the outcomes of the detailed model
are:
1. : is the probability that no output is pro-
duced by component , as a consequence of
an incorrect input;
2.  : is the probability that an expected
output is incorrectly not propagated by component
, as consequence of an internal fault;
3. : is the rate
of messages propagated by component  to
component ;
4. : is the correct emission probability;
5.  : is the emission failure probability. This
value encompasses both an expected wrong emis-
sion (as consequence of wrong internal processing)
and the unexpected emission (as consequence of an
internal self-generated false alarm).
All these parameters are used in the abstract
model of component  (see Figure 8) while
are used to derive
the parameter to be used in the detailed model
of . In the system framework and 
represent two components directly connected that exchange
messages in one direction (from  to ).
Summarizing, the overall solution scheme is shown
in Figure 9. The detailed models are solved separately: firstly
the model of  is solved, then the values provided
by equations (3) and (4) are passed as input to the detailed
model of   and so on. Finally, the probabilities of
correct/incorrect output (both propagated and not propa-
gated to the next stage) are passed to the corresponding
abstract models, they are joined together and then the overall
abstract model is solved.
The advantages of the proposed approach are in
two directions: first, to cope with the problem of state space
explosion when modeling a system composed of a large
number of independent components and, second, to allow
efficient model solution for those systems having most of
their components identical and interacting with each others
only by means of message exchange. Actually, in case the
components are not all equal, a larger number of detailed
models have to be solved but still separately. Thus, the
overall model, encompassing all the useful information with
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respect to the measures of interest, is achieved by joining
the abstract models.
4 AN INSTANCE OF A “MULTI-STAGE” SYSTEM: THE
CAUTION++ PROJECT
The IST-2001-38229 CAUTION++ project [1] aims at
developing a novel, low cost, flexible, highly efficient and
scalable system able to be utilized by mobile telephone op-
erators to increase the performance of all network segments.
Capacity utilization in cellular networks is an extremely im-
portant issue from the operators’ point of view. Successful
usage of all the system resources especially in congestion
situations can imply increased revenues for the cellular net-
work operators via reduced call blocking and dropping rates.
Also, in emergency situations the cellular networks are ex-
pected to work properly and be able to respond to the mo-
mentarily increased offered trafic. To pursue such goals,
proper system components are developed to handle gener-
ated alarms through a set of RRM (Radio Resource Man-
agement) techniques, to be applied where needed. The
CAUTION++ system, superimposed over the existing wire-
less networks, should allow putting in place correctly the
identified RRM techniques, hopefully despite the occur-
rence of faults. The rationale is to enforce design solutions
able to prevent a CAUTION++ component from carrying
out a reconfiguration action wrongly or when it is not nec-
essary (as consequence of some fault). Because of the in-
volved functionalities which pose relevant dependability
issues, the CAUTION++ project has promoted model-based
evaluation, aiming at assessing dependability attributes of
the architecture under development.
Figure 7: Part of the simplified system model
Figure 8: Relationships between models solutions
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Figure 10: Network architecture for provision
of capacity management mechanisms
Figure 10 shows the main components of the CAU-
TION++ architecture. Each network segment has its own
ITMU (Interface Trafic Monitoring Unit) and RMU (Re-
source Management unit) which allow to monitor and man-
age the attached network, respectively. Within each opera-
tor network, a GMU (Global Management unit) can perform
a global optimization. A Location Server (LS) can be used to
track users’ mobility and location: such information can be
exploited by GMU for a global optimization.
To practically show the usage of the proposed mod-
eling methodology, in this paper we consider a specific
architecture’s instance involving GSM/GPRS and WLAN
network technologies deployed by two distinct operators,
which is actually one of the trial systems set up by the
consortium as a demonstrator of the project’s results.
From the point of view of system composition, Fig-
ure 11 depicts the components included in such trial. Three
operators are involved, Op1, Op2 and Op3, with Op1 and
Op3 managing a WLAN network only, and Op2 managing
both a GPRS and a WLAN network. From the point of view
of CAUTION++ components employed in this instance,
each network segment has its own ITMU (Interface Trafic
Monitoring Unit) and RMU (Resource Management Unit)
which allow to monitor and manage the attached network,
respectively. Within each operator network, a GMU (Global
Management Unit) is necessary to perform a global optimi-
zation. In fact, different GMUs cooperate to optimize among
different operators. Therefore, this CAUTION++ instance
includes 4 ITMU, 4 RMU and 3 GMU, connected as shown
in Figure 11.
It is clearly an instance of a multi-stage system. Start-
ing from the GMU components (the root nodes of the graph,
see Section 2), we decompose the system in three sub-
systems, one for each GMU. Each subsystem can be seen
as a “3-stage” system, that is a “multistage” system com-
posed of 3 stages, in which all the components belonging
to a stage are identical. Moreover, each subsystem can be
represented as shown in Figure 7, as the “tree” structure
collapses in a unique “branch” from the point of view of
system evaluation. Therefore we have to solve only 3 de-
tailed models for subsystem.
4.1 COMPONENTS BEHAVIOR AND MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
In order to set up the detailed models, a character-
ization of the system components from the dependability
point of view is necessary, briefly outlined in the following.
Figure 9: Overall solution scheme
Figure 11: Trial configuration
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- Each CAUTION++ element (ITMU, RMU, GMU) can
be either correctly working or wrongly working.
- Each CAUTION++ element (ITMU, RMU, GMU) is
composed by three main elements: the Application Soft-
ware (AS), the Operating System (OS), and the Hard-
ware (HW). Each element has its own dependability
figures and reference values, that have been chosen as
explained later. In turn, the AS, OS, and HW can be
either correctly working or wrongly working.
- At the end of its computation, each CAUTION++
component can emit an output or not. More pre-
cisely, the possible output can be either correct/in-
correct emission or correct/incorrect silence.
- Fault tolerance mechanisms are in place in each sys-
tem component, in order to improve the dependabil-
ity of the components themselves and limit the error
propagation between interacting elements. They are
interface checks (to detect errors at input/output
level), diagnosis and repair mechanisms. Their abil-
ity to work properly depends on their respective
coverage.
In addition, a set of assumptions has been identified
with the aim of enhancing simplicity and clarity (essential
to keep the whole modeling activity under control), still
capturing the relevant phenomena which impact the mea-
sures under analysis (essential to the practical usefulness
of the evaluation effort). The complete list is in [5] and [6];
here we omit those strictly related with details of the models
not shown in this paper.
- The input to the detailed model may be either correct
with probability αor incorrect with probability 1-α .
- Each CAUTION++ element (ITMU, RMU, GMU) can
generate by itself spurious outputs (that is, outputs
not triggered by an external input; it is a manifesta-
tion of a fault in the component). Spurious outputs
are independent from outputs generated by real in-
puts and follow an exponential distribution.
- The coverage of the Input interface checks is given
by the probability inputCoverage. When Output in-
terface checks are considered, the detection of an
erroneous output leads to a non-emission of an out-
put (silence behavior, which may be correct or incor-
rect depending on the inputs originating it and/or
on the correctness of the component’s status) with
probability outputCoverage.
- An undetected erroneous state of the AS may disap-
pear when the OS is repaired, e.g. in the case of OS
re-booting.
- An undetected erroneous state either at the AS or
OS level may disappear when the HW is repaired
(because of necessary system reboot, no hot-
pluggable redundancy is envisioned).
- An undetected erroneous state either disappears or
propagates and reveals itself.
5 SKETCH OF THE MODELS DERIVED FOR THE SELECTED
CAUTION++ TRIAL
In this Section, the models derived for the analysis
of the selected CAUTION++ instance of Figure  11 are briefly
outlined. First, the measures of interest are described, since
they influence the definition of the system models.
5.1 MEASURES OF INTEREST
As previously mentioned, the goal of the CAU-
TION++ system is to increase the performance of all the
controlled cellular networks. Then we expect it should never
have a negative impact on the networks behavior, at the
most becoming inactive in the worst case. Therefore, the
main dependability requirement of CAUTION++ is that it
should avoid taking wrong decisions, thus acting worse
than doing nothing.
Particularly, an incorrect silence behavior (that is the
system does not provide any output when, if correct, it
would have emitted one) can be tolerated, since it leads to
no benefit from CAUTION++. On the contrary, an incorrect
emission of an output can lead the system to act worse than
doing nothing, and therefore actions would be required to
prevent such failure mode.
We have identified the following indicators as sig-
nificant measures to evaluate the dependability of the CAU-
TION++ architecture. They are:
- The probability of incorrect emission at level of the
GMU employed by a certain operator;
- Mean Time to Failure of the GMU employed by a
certain operator;
- Reliability of the whole system(with contributions
from all the present GMUs).
They appear to be suitable measures to evaluate the
ability of CAUTION++ in fulfilling the general dependabil-
ity requirement of not undertaking wrong reconfiguration
actions.
5.2 DETAILED AND ABSTRACT MODELS
In accordance with the proposed methodology de-
scribed in Section 3, the starting point is the definition of a
functional model for each involved component. Each func-
tional (“abstract”) model has to take into account all the
relationships among critical services that, in this trial, are
the emissions of outputs from ITMU to RMU and from
RMU to GMU. The generic “abstract” model is represented
in Figure 12, using the SAN [7] formalism.
Figure 12: Generic abstract sub-models
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It is valid for ITMU, RMU and GMU. The input gate
gInput_X allows handling the input of the component (both
the correct input - place Correct_W - and corrupted input -
place Corrupted_W). Transition lambda_X fires with a rate,
where,  are the 
rate of messages in input to component X and the rate of
spurious messages generated by X, respectively.
Then, an output is produced. This output can be
either correctly emitted (a token is moved in place Correct_X
with probability pCorrect_X) or incorrectly emitted (a to-
ken is moved in place Corrupted_X with probability
pCorrupted_X) or correctly non-emitted (a token is moved
in place NoOutCorr_X with a probability pnoOutCorr_X)
or incorrectly non-emitted (a token is moved in place
NoOutIncorr_X with probability pnoOutIncorr_X). An out-
put is propagated at the upper level of the CAUTION++
hierarchy (or as final output in case of GMU) with a rate
.
To obtain the parameters of each abstract model, the
corresponding detailed models have to be set-up and solved.
Therefore, a detailed model is built for each involved com-
ponent. Since ITMU, RMU and GMU employ the same sub-
components (HW, OS and AS, plus fault tolerance mecha-
nisms, as already discussed), the detailed model is almost
the same for all of them. The only difference is in the values
of their parameters (as explained later in the section on nu-
merical evaluation). A generic detailed model is obtained by
composing the generic detailed models for the component’s
subcomponents (i.e., HW, OS and AS) together with the
dynamics of the error and fault detection mechanisms em-
ployed. The presentation of this model is omitted for brev-
ity (refer [5] for a complete exposition); here only a simpli-
fied generic detailed model for the subcomponent Y (where
Y  maybe  AS, OS or HW) is sketched in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Detailed model for AS, OS, and HW
A token in place Y_Up indicates that Y is working
correctly. The firing of transition Y_toDown models its fail-
ure: this failure can be detected (a token moves in the place
Y_DownDet) or not (a token moves in the place
Y_DownNoDet) with probabilities Y_Coverage and
1-Y_Coverage, respectively (Y_Coverage represents the
coverage of the error detection mechanisms implemented in
the element Y). An undetected failure can be revealed after
a while; the firing of transition Y_noDet indicates such fail-
ure detection. A detected failure is then recovered by means
of the transition Y_repair. An undetected erroneous state
may disappear if the input gate Y_toUp_gate enables the
instantaneous transition Y_toUp, for example in the case of
OS re-booting if Y = AS.
The overall model for the CAUTION++ instance
under analysis has been constructed under the following
assumptions:
- Messages coming from different ITMUs and RMUs
are indistinguishable.
- The RMUs and the GMUs process the incoming
input requests (from the ITMUs and RMUs respec-
tively) individually and sequentially.
Figure 14: Composed model at GMU decision level
Figure 14 shows the SAN composed model for ana-
lyzing the CAUTION++ behavior at a single GMU decision
level (e.g., to evaluate the probability of correctness of a
reconfiguration decision issued by a GMU). Thanks to the
above assumptions, the evaluation of the whole CAU-
TION++ instance is easily obtained by mathematically com-
bining the evaluations at single GMU level, in accordance
with the specific measure under analysis.
6 EVALUATION RESULTS
The preceding models have been numerically solved
using the analytical solver provided by the Möbius tool [8].
Since all the timed transitions are exponentially distributed
and the state space dimension of the models was not huge,
it was possible to pursue an analytical solution achieving
more accurate results than through simulation. Given the
nature of the measures of interest, we resorted to a steady-
state analysis for all models.
6.1 SETTINGS FOR THE NUMERICAL EVALUATION
The developed models have a number of internal
parameters, to which values have to be assigned. For many
of them, reference values from manufactures or previous
studies in the literature are available. For others, mainly
those concerning the components to be developed in the
CAUTION++ framework, this is not true and the choice of
appropriate values is more critical. Therefore, for such criti-
cal parameters, a range of values is experimented in the
analysis, to determine the impact of such variations on the
analyzed dependability figures (sensitivity analysis). Table
2 lists the varying parameters, and the range of values as-
signed to them in the analysis. The extension _X makes the
parameter’s name generic, and need to be properly substi-
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tuted by ITMU, RMU, GMU to indicate the parameters of
the corresponding component. Since the models have been
just sketched in this paper, not all the involved parameters
have been listed in Table 2.
The values assigned to the missing parameters are
the same applied in [5].
Table 2: Varying model parameters and Their values
The meaning of the parameters in Table 2 is as fol-
lows:
- αITMU, αRMU and αGMU are the probabilities that
the input provided to ITMU, RMU and GMU, re-
spectively, is correct;
- MTBA_ITMU, MTBA_RMU and MTBA_GMU are
the mean time between two inputs to ITMU, RMU
and GMU, respectively (in the case of ITMU, it is
the mean time between two external inputs for which
ITMU generates an alarm to RMU);
- MTBFA_X is the mean time between two spurious
outputs emitted by a generic component X ;
- InputCoverage_X is the coverage of the error detec-
tion checks at input interface;
- OutputCoverage_X is the coverage of the error de-
tection checks at output interface;
- AS_Coverage_X is the coverage of the application
software checks.
6.2 NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present and discuss the results
obtained. To keep the notation in the figures as light as
possible, we indicate with I/OCov the coverage of the input
and output interface (which is the same for ITMU, RMU
and GMU), and with ASCov the coverage of the application
software (again, it is the same for ITMU, RMU and GMU).
Figure 15 shows the probability of incorrect emis-
sion of the GMU managed by Operator1 (it is actually the
same for Operator3 also), at varying values of the coverage
of the I/O Interface Checks and the coverage of the Appli-
cation Software. The probability of incorrect emission de-
creases as the probability of coverage of the I/O Interface
Checks increases; instead, it is very lightly influenced by
As Coverage. Looking at the two overlapping curves, it can
be observed that the impact of the correctness of the input
to ITMU is not relevant. Therefore concerning the emis-
sion failure probability, significant benefits are achieved
using the Interface Checks, since more incorrect messages
are detected and no output is produced in these cases.
Figure 16 shows the reliability of the trial system at
varying the observation time, that is the overall probability
that the system does not undertake wrong actions. We sup-
pose that the overall system fails if at least one root compo-
nent fails or, equivalently, one GMU undertake a wrong
action. The reliability of the trial system at time t is then equal to e
and  is the mean time to failure related to operator i.
Therefore, we have solved the three operators sub-nets
separately, and then we have obtained the reliability for the
whole system by exploiting the previous formula.
The plots have been obtained by fixing the mean
time between alarms to 12 hours and the probability of cor-
rect input to ITMU to 0.98. The varying parameter is the
MTBFA. The reliability of the system quickly decreases at
Figure 15: Incorrect emission probability
related to Operator 1 (or Operator 3)
Figure 16: Reliability of the trial system
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lower values of MTBFA. In the figure, also an “extreme
case” curve is plotted, obtained considering totally correct
the external input to the ITMU, and assuming a very high
coverage (0.99) for all the employed error detection mecha-
nisms. The idea was to understand how would be the reli-
ability of the CAUTION++ instance, in case a highly robust
implementation of the CAUTION++ components is per-
formed and in absence of faults external to the system. It
can be appreciated that in such a case the reliability curve
has a very good trend.
Despite the insertion of CAUTION++ induces a small
reliability penalty (as exemplified by Figure 16), it is never-
theless very beneficial, since CAUTION++ allows to in-
crease the resource utilization of the underlying networks
through a cooperation among them. This is the final goal of
the project that justifies the existence of system and the
consequently introduction of new errors.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 are plotted at varying values
of the mean time between alarms and the mean time be-
tween spurious outputs, and setting to 0.98 the probability
that the input to ITMU is correct. Not surprisingly, all the
curves follow an increasing trend. Note that the time to an
incorrect emission is significantly different for Operator 1
(or Operator 3) and Operator 2.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has focused on a methodology for quan-
titative dependability evaluation of systems structured in a
hierarchical fashion and on its application to a case study.
In more details, in the first part of the work an effi-
cient modeling methodology has been presented, consist-
ing in defining “abstract” and “detailed” models of the sys-
tem components, so as to reduce complexity and gain effi-
ciency both at model design and at model solution levels.
In the second part, an instance of the CAUTION++
architecture has been selected, as a representative case
study of the class of systems our methodology is directed
to. In accordance with the basic dependability requirements
stated in CAUTION++, the evaluated dependability indica-
tors have been the probability of an incorrect output emis-
sion, the Mean Time to Failure of a GMU component and
the reliability of the whole instance. We resorted to an ana-
lytical solution, using the automatic Möbius tool.
Thanks to the application of our modeling method-
ology and resolution technique, the biggest model solved
had less than 1000 states, and the time needed to perform a
single study did never exceed one minute on a Pentium M
1.3 GHz, 512Mb Ram PC. Actually, most of the time required
to the resolution technique is due to the manual passing of
the parameters’ values between the detailed models and
from these to the abstract one. Such waste of time could be
significantly reduced using an automatic tools that could
be developed in future works. The same simple trial could
hardly be solved just considering a monolithic model com-
posed of three detailed submodels only. In fact, supposing
an average of 500 states per submodel, the size of the state-
space would be of the order of magnitude of 108
(500x500x500). Although this is only an approximated cal-
culus that, in addition, does not take into account the pos-
sible symmetries that could reduce the size of the overall
state-space, it lets us appreciate the contribution of the
proposed methodology in solving such types of systems.
Of course, there is still work to do in evaluating the
effectiveness of the methodology in more complex sce-
narios. Anyway, the indications that we are able to provide
at the moment, as derived from this study, seem to be very
encouraging.
The obtained results allow to understand the impact
of several factors contributing to the dependability of the
single CAUTION++ components on the overall system in-
stance. Moreover, this study can be useful to guide imple-
mentation choices addressing dependability, by providing
comparative quantitative assessment of possible alternatives.
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